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The NOTRE DAME LAWYER
A Monthly Law Review

"Law is the perfection of human reason '
VOLUME V.

MIARCH, 1930

NUMBER 6

Whither Goest Thou
By Jimls F. KIRBY
Society changes. The ideals of one generation are
mocked by the next. The great Kent in 1823 spoke of the
menacing hand of the injunction, Jerome v. Ross, 7 John
Ch. 315. In 1902 Chief Justice Start said that one man
should not so violate the rights of another without feeling
the restraining hand of equity, Colliton v. Oaborough, 86
Minn. 361. Still the relief asked in New York was not so
far reaching as that asked in Minnesota one hundred years
later.
The American colonists rebelled against the general
warrant. Today it is said that officers should enter the homes
of the citizens on mere rumor without a warrant of any
kind. In their indictment of their king they alleged that he
had made judges depend on his will alone for the tenure of
their offices and the amount and payment.of their salaries.
Today it is proposed to have offenses tried without juries
by commissioners who will hold office at the will of the government, their tenure of office depending upon their -decisions. They charged him with quartering large bodies of
troops among them and through mock trials _protecting
them against punishment for murders committed by them.
Today we have large bodies of armed men going about the
highways, even in the interior of the country, stopping peaceable, law-abiding citizens, without any pretense of a warrant, and searching their vehicles and their persons. The
penalty, for not being able to distinguish in the dead of
night between an officer not in uniform and a highwayman,
is death by gun-fire without right of trial. When the killer
is charged in the courts of the outraged state with an offense
based on these facts, the case is lugged over into another sys-
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tern of courts and the defense conducted by the officers of
the government and at the public expense. They charged
the king with depriving them of the benefits of trial by
jury. Scarcely a day passes at the present time that some
one does not make a demand in the public press for the
utter abolition of jury trials. These things go on and
scarcely a voice is raised in protest. True there may be protest against the things that are done but not against the
method of doing them. There are not wanting myriads of
men who loudly protest being deprived of a drink, but none
who protest against the methods by which they are deprived.
Reverting to the jury trial many today declare that the
unfit should not he born. Many states have passed laws on
the subject of eugenics; whether such method of dealing
with a human being is moral or immoral belongs to the
theologian; whether it is cruel or kind belongs to the humanist; whether it is injurious or beneficial to the health of mind
and body belongs to the doctor; whether it will accomplish
the desired end in the best manner belongs to the sociologist:
the procedure employed and its effects upon our legal rights.
properly belong to the lawyer. In Virginia the defendant
is passed upon by a board with the right of appeal to the
Circuit Court but in the trial the court sits without a jury.
This law has been held constitutional by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of Buck v. Bell, 47 S.
Ct. 584.
A few years ago a state passed such a law against which
it might be said that it violated the following principles
theretofore considered to be a part of the American form
of government, for the reason that the citizen's rights were
taken:
1, Without trial by jury; 2, without the witnesses for
the state being compelled to confront the accused; 3 without
the witnesses for the state being put under oath; in other
words, on nsworn testimony; 4, on the testimony of witnesses not subject to cross-examination, the defendant having no right to appear and cross-examine the witnesses;
5, on hearsay testimony; sometimes mere letters informally
written to members of the Board, and on mere rumor, etc.;
6, without allowing the defendant to make a defense and
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contradict the charges made against him or his ancestors,
i. e., the Board need not allow the defendant to make a defense or to introduce evidence contradicting charges made
against him; 7, without trial in any duly constituted court
and without any legal process whatever, let alone due process of law; 8, without requiring any charge to be formulated against or any notice to be given the defendant; 9, without the defendant under this law being allowed the right
to employ counsel to arrange his defense, or to appear for
him; 10, by a politically appointed Board or bureau appointed by the chief executive of the state.
This law was passed by the legislature of a great state
and incorporated into its jurisprudence without protest. It
was hailed as the panacea for all social ills without a thought
for the safeguarding of the citizen's rights against the exercise of unlimited power by a political bureaucracy. However, as time went on some raised their voices, not against
the results to be accomplished, but against the method of
invading the individual's rights and the breaking down of
the safeguards which constitute the bulwarks of American
liberty. The result was that laws so recklessly violative of
human rights were in many cases held unconstitutional by
the courts, or on a proper showing to the legislatures, voluntarily repealed or modified.
In 1929 the general assembly of the state of Iowa took
up the passage of such a law. If such a law can be justified
at all, this law is a model in safeguarding the legal rights of
the defendant. It is found in the Acts of the 43rd General
Assembly of the State of Iowa, Chapter 66, Page 106, sections one to twenty. The first section names the officers who
are to administer the law. The second section designates
specifically and clearly the classes of persons who are subject to the law and provides for jurisdiction over those included in these classes, who are at liberty as well as those
confined in state institutions. Sections thirteen, fourteen and
fifteen provide for appeal to the courts and for a jury trial.
It would seem that in the twenty sections of this statute
nothing has been overlooked by way of preserving the form
and substance of due process of law.
Formerly it was believed by Americans that the individual accused of crime should be tried by a jury of his peers in
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the district in which the crime was alleged to have been committed. It was believed, in addition to this, that the punishment he was to receive should be fixed by the court that
heard the evidence establishing his guilt. A few years ago
a great agitation was started in the country by reformers
claiming this method of dealing with the criminal was entirely wrong. These reformers said that the punishment
of the criminal should not be administered to him by way
of revenge for his crime, but that the punishment, if such
it was to be called, should be inflicted by way of reforming
the criminal. They said that no court in sentencing a man
could tell how long it would take to reform him so that he
would be fit to be returned again to society as a citizen with
proper social orientation.
The result of this agitation was the passage of what
is known as the indeterminate sentence law. Under this law
the court that tries the man who is accused of crime is, if he
is convicted, obliged to sentence him for the maximum period
imposed by law. Then after he has served a certain time,
As provided by statute, the Board of Parole takes up his
case and after determining that he has reformed and is fit
again to be returned to society he is put on parole. While
on parole the board attempts to keep track of him and watch
him and in some states to aid him in 'finding employment
and keeping himself employed in legal and gainful occupations. It would be rash to say that the increase of crime and
the large number of inmates in our penal institutions are
due to this law or any other one fact. However, the operation of the law has not succeeded in the last quarter of a
century in bringing about the millennium.
As noted above, the great lawyers and judges of one
hundred years ago greatly feared the injunction. It was
just a little before this time that the English Court of Chancery under the leadership of Hardwick, Thurlow and Eldon
had extended the injunction to cases of trespass. The Great
Chancellor Kent of New York feared it, but since then the
injunction has branched out, principally by the extension
of the doctrine of nuisance, until now it is almost impossible
to commit any act denounced by law except the very primitive, savage crimes that cannot be twisted by some legisla-
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tive act, or by some -judicial decision, into a nuisance, the
act enjoined and the defendant punished, not by a properly
constituted criminal court on the verdict of a jury, but by a
judge sitting alone as a Chancellor who, in a decree, declares
that the defendant has failed to treat him with proper respect, i. e., is in contempt of court.
One of the latest developments of this kind is a decision
of the Supreme Court of Louisiana which declares that the
violation of any criminal statute is in itself a nuisance and
may be enjoined. Possibly the court did not mean to make
so broad a pronouncement, that we should look at what the
court did and not at what it said. What it did was to enjoin
a man from opening a store in a neighborhood in which he
was forbidden to do so by a so-called zoning ordinance. This
ordinance forbade the doing of this act and imposed proper
sanction to insure obedience, but the parties interested did
not see fit to proceed criminally against the defendant. They
sought and obtained an injunction to restrain him from
opening the store so that in case he did, his act might be
punished not as a crime in a criminal prosecution but as a
contempt of court in an equity proceeding, City. of New
Orleans v. Liberty Shop, 101 So. 798.
The Englishman is a stickler for freedom of speech
and of the press and for the right of trial by jury in cases
of libel and slander. At one time we vehemently asserted
that we. inherited this in all its vigor. But are we secure in
these rights? The Minnesota Laws 1925, Chapter 285, read
in part as follows: "Any person who .

.

. shall be engaged

in the business of regularly or customarily producing, publishing or circulating, having in possession, selling or giving away... (a) a malicious, scandalous and defamatory
newspaper.., is guilty of a nuisance and all persons guilty
of such nuisance may be enjoined, as hereinafter provided.
. . . In actions brought under (b) above, there shall be

available the defense that the truth was published with
good motives and for justifiable ends."
This law has been held constitutional by the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, State ex rel. Olson v. Guilf6rd et al.,
174 Minn. 457.
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The last of this brood by which the rights of the citizen are modified and by which he is subjected to a formerly
unheard-of procedure and a formerly unheard-of punishment is what is called the habitual criminal acts. These laws
provide that after a man is convicted of the commission of
a felony a certain number of times, usually about four times,
he automatically becomes an habitual criminal. In such case
he does not receive the punishment due to the crime that
he has committed, if a first conviction, but he is sentenced
to the penitentiary for life. This works out in this way.
Two men may be arraigned in court for the same offense
on the same day. Both have committed the same act, possibly they have committed the act jointly. Each of these
men may have committed the same number of crimes, in
fact their criminal record may be identically the same; may
extend over a long period of time and involve many crimes;'
yet one of these men, because he has not been convicted
before, i. e., because he has not been caught, may receive
a sentence in prison of one year while his fellow criminal
will receive a sentence for life because he has been unfortunate enough to have been caught a number of times.
It will not do to say that n6 changes should be made
in the law. Changing conditions of society bring about
changes in the law. The ultimate objects attempted to be
accomplished by many of these innovations are laudable.
The promotion of temperance; the improvement of the type
of our citizens; the prevention of miscarriage of justice, so
often seen in the jury room; the suppression of blackmailers;
the restraining of constantly repeating criminals, who are
only released from prison to commit fresh crime and again
to be returned,-are laudable objects to be aimed at. The
intention of this short article is not to denounce, but to call
attention to the fact that there is a spirit abroad of doing
things in a different way than these things were done or
attempted to be done by our fathers. The danger of all this
innovation is that in attempting to reach results by short
cuts, we may undermine the foundations of our great structure of human liberty that in our haste to ace6mplish good
by law, we may dethrone the goddess of right and in her
place set up the idol of the supreme state.

